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The Aggregate Effects of Trade and Migration: 
Evidence from OECD Countries
* 
 
Two large but separate bodies of literature analyze the economic effects of international trade 
and immigration. Given that several factors are important determinants of both trade and 
migration flows, the previous studies are vulnerable to a potentially serious omitted-variables 
bias, questioning the validity of existing estimates of the effects of trade and immigration on 
income. This paper provides estimates of the effects of trade and immigration on income in a 
unified framework. We also provide a useful decomposition of the channels at work in terms 
of the employment rate, the capital intensity, and total factor productivity of the receiving 
economy. We assemble panel data on immigration flows, output, employment and capital 
stocks for thirty OECD countries over the period 1980-2007. In order to identify the causal 
effects of trade and immigration on economic outcomes we adopt and extend the gravity-
based approach in Frankel and Romer (1999). Our predictors for trade and immigration flows 
are based on geography and the demographic trends of each country’s trade and migration 
partners. We find that immigration has a large, positive effect on the employment rate of the 
receiving country. However, it leaves income per capita unaffected because of an offsetting 
negative effect on TFP. In contrast, trade flows appear to increase income per capita, mainly 
through TFP growth, and have no impact on the employment rate. The positive employment 
effect of immigration is the most robust of all the effects identified in this paper. 
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Economists believe that an important part of the economic success of countries is driven by their openness to
ideas, investment, capital and labor from the rest of the world. Open economies enjoy the beneﬁts from new
ideas and goods, greater competition and access to skills and talents beyond those already within their borders.
All these forces can potentially fuel economic growth. However, exposure to competition from the rest of the
world may also have negative eﬀects on subsets of the population. Globalization of trade ﬂo w si so f t e nb l a m e d
for the oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing jobs, employment losses in previously protected industries, and downward
pressure on the wages of low-skill workers in rich countries. Likewise greater openness to immigration is often
seen as a threat to the labor market outcomes of domestic workers.
The literature on the economic eﬀects of globalization has evolved along separate branches regarding the
eﬀects of greater openness to trade and migration ﬂows. The trade literature has focused on quantifying the gains
from trade and its channels. To mention but a few, Coe and Helpman (1995) examined the role of international
t r a d ea sav e h i c l eo fk n o w l e d g ed i ﬀusion. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) investigated the eﬀects of trade on wages.
Frankel and Romer (1999) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) analyzed the eﬀects of trade openness on economic
growth and aggregate productivity. In comparison, the immigration literature has concentrated mainly on the
labor-market eﬀects, with an emphasis on the outcomes of low-skill native workers (e.g. Card, 2001; Borjas,
2003, and many others.). Only a few papers have considered openness to trade and migration within the same
framework. Speciﬁcally, Borjas, Freeman, Katz, DiNardo, and Abowd (1997) used the factor proportions model
to evaluate the joint eﬀect of trade and migration on factor prices. More recently, Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright
(2010) have analyzed the employment eﬀect of hiring immigrants and oﬀ-shoring jobs on native employment in
the context of many productive tasks.
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the aggregate economic eﬀects of openness by extending
the empirical framework in Frankel and Romer (1999) by including openness to immigration in addition to
trade openness. Considering these two dimensions of openness jointly is potentially crucial for the analysis as
migration and trade are very highly correlated and often driven by the same determinants. Yet, immigration and
trade policies in most countries are rather diﬀerent from each other. Empirical studies that only consider one
dimension of openness are thus vulnerable to a potentially serious omitted variable bias. Moreover trade ﬂows
are increasingly associated and tied with oﬀ-shoring and re-importing of intermediate goods (hence with capital
movements) and migration, especially those of highly educated, are associated with transfers of knowledge and
human capital. Hence these two ﬂows capture most of the relevant circulation of ideas and technology that
has been unleashed in the era of globalization. From a policy point of view, it is crucial to know whether the
employment and productivity eﬀects of openness are mainly driven by immigration or by trade since the policy
implications are vastly diﬀerent. This paper aims at separately identifying the economic eﬀects of these two
2dimensions of openness.
Our analysis also decomposes the overall eﬀect of openness on output into several components: labor inten-
sity (measured by employment rate), capital intensity (measured by capital per worker), and technology and
production eﬃciency (measured by total factor productivity). This decomposition is useful because it allows
us to evaluate the relevance of diﬀerent channels through which economies adjust to increases in economic
openness. As discussed earlier, there are multiple channels through which trade ﬂows can aﬀect income. This
is also the case for immigration, as highlighted by the large number of recent contributions to this question.
For instance, immigration may aﬀect aggregate income through its eﬀects on native workers’ employment and
wages (as in Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2011; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright, 2010; Chassamboulli and
Palivos, 2010). It may also alter the receiving economy’s industrial and occupational composition (e.g. Cortés
and Tessada, 2010; Farré, González, and Ortega, 2009; Frattini, 2010; Peri and Sparber, 2009) the relative
capital-labor intensities and production technologies at the industry or at the ﬁrm level (Lewis, 2005; González
and Ortega, 2011; Dustmann and Glitz, 2010). While there is some evidence that all these channels are at work,
their relative importance has not yet been explored. Our results are helpful in this respect because some of
these mechanisms will induce changes in labor intensity, while others will mostly operate through changes in
capital intensity or total factor productivity.
Obviously, economic development is a cause as well as a consequence, of immigration and trade. Hence,
uncovering the causal eﬀects of openness to international trade and migration is not a trivial task. Building
on Frankel and Romer (1999), we exploit the fact that countries diﬀer in their geographic location and in
the demographic trends of their trade partners and migrant-sending countries. This allows us to construct
predictions for openness to trade and migration that can be considered exogenous to country-speciﬁcu n o b s e r v e d
determinants of income growth. Our predictors are based solely on the demographic trends of partner countries
and on geography. As long as these variables are not directly causing economic growth in the destination
countries our exclusion restriction will be satisﬁed. Furthermore we also argue that our instrumental-variables
strategy allows us to separately identify the causal eﬀects of trade and immigration.
This paper also contributes to the literature by providing a new migration dataset with a larger coverage
in terms of years and countries than used in previous studies. We assemble annual data on bilateral trade
and migration ﬂows into thirty OECD countries originating from all countries in the world for the period
1980-2007. Our bilateral migration data is the result of merging several sources (United Nations, OECD
Migration database and Mayda 2010), imputing some missing values, and homogenizing deﬁnitions. We have
also conducted numerous consistency checks. The bilateral trade data are taken from the IFS Direction of
Trade Statistics (2007) revision and include trade between the OECD countries and 190 partners in each year
(with some missing in the years before 1989) beginning in 1980. Our dataset also contains income per person,
3employment, population and capital stocks for all OECD countries for 1980-2007. These data allow for a joint
analysis of the eﬀects of trade and migration on income both in the short run (annual) and in the medium run
(four-year periods) on a sample of countries that accounts for a very large share of world trade and migration
over our period of interest. We also note that by restricting our analysis to OECD destination countries we
reduce the likelihood that diﬀerences in the quality of institutions or other unobserved factors may operate as
confounding factors.
Our analysis is closely related to Frankel and Romer (1999) but diﬀers from it in several important aspects.
As noted already, our main speciﬁcations feature both trade openness and immigration rates as regressors.
Second, we exploit both the cross-sectional and longitudinal variation of the data, which allows us to estimate
speciﬁcations that account for all time-invariant determinants of income.1 Third, we explicitly consider the eﬀect
of globalization on employment-population ratios, capital intensity and TFP. The ﬁrst is particularly important
since in the presence of labor market rigidities it may well be the case that globalization has important eﬀects
on employment (rather than output per worker) in the short and medium run.
Our analysis delivers three main results. First, our instrumental-variables estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings in
Frankel and Romer (1999) in the speciﬁcations that feature trade openness only as a regressor (that is, omitting
immigration). Namely, trade openness has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on income per capita, already in
the short run, arising mainly from a large positive eﬀect on the employment rate. Second, when we consider
the analogous speciﬁcation for immigration (that is, omitting trade openness) we obtain very similar results.
Immigration is associated with a short-run increase in income per capita driven mostly by an increase in the
employment rate. However, when we include both trade openness and immigration (whose bilateral ﬂows are
highly correlated) as regressors the pattern of estimates changes signiﬁcantly, indicating an important omitted
variable bias in the previous estimates.
Our instrumental-variables estimates of the econometric models accounting jointly for trade and immigration
suggest that trade still has a positive eﬀect on income per capita. However, this eﬀect is smaller than before and
it operates mainly through a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP growth. In comparison, immigration has no
eﬀect on income per capita in the short run. Moreover the decomposition reveals that immigration has a large,
positive eﬀect on the economy’s employment rate that is oﬀset by a negative eﬀect on TFP. There appears to
be no signiﬁcant changes to capital intensity, suggesting that immigration triggers a capital inﬂow that helps
prevent capital dilution even in the short run. This pattern of results is robust to restricting our analysis to
a subsample for which we have higher quality data or a more balanced bilateral panel and to accounting for
re-migration and out-migration. Moreover, when we consider long time-diﬀerences the previous ﬁndings are
qualitatively conﬁrmed.
1Speciﬁcally, our dependent variables are log changes. Hence, time-invariant factors have been diﬀerenced out.
4The magnitude of the eﬀects described above, using our preferred basic speciﬁcation, is the following. A
one percentage point increase in trade openness increases income per capita by 06 to 09%.A n i m m i g r a t i o n
ﬂow equal to one percent of the population increases the economy’s employment rate by approximately one
percent. Speciﬁcally, a gross inﬂow of immigrants equal to 1% of the population leads to a 15% increase in
total employment and to a 05% increase in population2. As a result, the employment-population ratio increases
by about 1%. A possible interpretation of these ﬁndings, discussed further in the conclusions, is as follows. Trade
openness stimulates economic growth by inducing a relocation of factors across industries and ﬁrms leading to
gains in production eﬃciency (as in Melitz 2003). At the aggregate level this is reﬂected in TFP growth. On the
other hand immigration stimulates employment growth by providing skills complementary to those of natives
(e.g. Ottaviano and Peri, 2011), and pushing ﬁrms to create more jobs in immigration intensive sectors. Firms
can cut costs on those jobs by paying immigrants less than their marginal productivity (e.g. Chassamboulli and
Palivos, 2010; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright, 2010). This generates employment opportunities for native workers,
with some downward pressure on productivity per worker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and the empirical speciﬁca-
tions that we use to analyze the impact of immigration and openness to trade on economic outcomes. Section
3 describes the data and the construction of the instruments. Section 4 presents the main estimates. Section 5
presents our robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
Our simple framework can be described with just a few equations. It is an extension of Frankel and Romer
(1999). We generically represent an economic outcome for country  in year  with . In what follows, 
alternatively stands for income per person  or one of its components, such as its employment-population ratio
, its capital-labor ratio , or its total factor productivity  In the fashion of the cross-country economic
growth literature, we assume a production function that combines capital and labor in a Cobb-Douglas fashion,




Employment-population ratio  summarizes the labor intensity, capital per worker  is the (relative)
intensity in the use of capital, and total factor productivity  is a measure of the quality-eﬃciency of capital
and labor. It is plausible to expect that each of these variables will be aﬀected by the general degree of openness
2As several people re-migrate it is reasonable to expect that the growth in population is smaller than the inﬂow of immigrants.
5of the economy through the frequency of interactions with foreign economic agents and the resulting exchange
of ideas, skills, factors of production, and more intense product-market competition. Building on Frankel and
Romer (1999), we assume that a country’s economic outcomes are a log-linear function of its cumulated exposure
to international trade. Continued exposure to international trade spreads knowledge, stimulates competition
and selects more productive ﬁrms. It is, however, important to control for the size of the country. Large
countries are more diversiﬁed in terms of ideas, skills, and factors of production, which increases the frequency
of productive interactions taking place within their borders. We also postulate that the frequency and quality
of these economic interactions can also depend on the country’s cumulated openness to immigration.3 More
formally,
ln = 0
 +  +  +  + 0
 (2)
As noted earlier, , the economic outcome of interest for country  in year , depends on , a measure
of the accumulated openness to foreign goods (for instance, the stock of imported capital or ideas relative to
the total stock),  is a measure of the accumulated openness to foreign individuals (such as the stock of
immigrants as share of the population), and  c a p t u r e st h es i z eo ft h ec o u n t r y . T h et e r m0
 captures the
other systematic determinants of the outcome variables and 0
 is a mean-zero random variable accounting for
random shocks to ln. In time-diﬀerences, expression (2) becomes
∆ln =  +  +  +  (3)
where  and  are ﬂow measures of openness to international trade and international migration, respec-
tively. We proxy these ﬂow measures using exports plus imports as a share of GDP (for )a n dt h eﬂow of
new immigrants relative to the population of the country at the beginning of the year (for ). Let us note
that these measures of openness to trade and to immigration are relative to the scale of the country (in terms
of output or population) because they proxy for exposure to foreign goods and foreign individuals. Note also
that the time-invariant measure of country size has been diﬀerenced out. Obviously, disturbance  has a zero
mean as it is the diﬀerence between 0
 and 0
−1.
The main empirical challenge in the estimation of (3) is the potential endogeneity of the exposure to both
foreign goods and foreign people, as shocks to economic activity may aﬀect both. Countries that receive positive
shocks to income per capita may increase their international trade ﬂows and may also attract more immigrants.
To isolate the causal eﬀect of openness to foreign goods and people on a country’s economic outcomes we use
the fact that openness is also a function of two kinds of external factors: the country’s geographic location
and the size of its potential (trade and migration) partners. W ea s s u m et h a tt h e s ef a ctors are uncorrelated
3Consider, for instance, the sustained increase in migration ﬂows within EU countries since the Schengen treaty was adopted.
6with unobserved determinants of economic growth in our country of interest, as given by equation (3). More
speciﬁcally, the time-invariant geographic variables include bilateral distance, common border, colonial ties and
common language. The potential partner characteristics we consider are purely demographic (population size
and the share of young individuals in the population) and vary over time.
We estimate auxiliary regressions that predict bilateral trade and migration ﬂows using demographic infor-
mation for the potential partner countries, and bilateral geographic (and cultural) variables. These regressions
are closely related to the highly successful gravity equations in the international trade and migration literature
(and both recently micro-founded by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Grogger and Hanson (2008)).
However, our predictors diﬀer from the standard gravity regressions in one fundamental point. In our bilateral
regressions we omit all information regarding the destination country. For instance, we predict the trade (mi-
gration) ﬂows between country  and its trading partner  using only the (plausibly exogenous) interactions of
the time-invariant bilateral characteristics and the time-varying demographics of country .T h u s ,i fc o u n t r y is
located near large countries in terms of population it will be predicted to have a high degree of trade (migration)
openness.4
More speciﬁcally, we assume that trade openness of country  towards country  is described by:
ln =  + 








The dependent variable is the sum of the bilateral trade between the two countries (exports from  to  plus
exports from  to ) relative to the destination country’s GDP. In the right-hand side,  is an intercept,  is
the population in country of origin  in year ,  is an indicator for common border,  is bilateral distance,
 is an indicator for colonial ties,  is an indicator for common language, and 
 is a zero-mean error term.
Similarly we express the openness to migration of country  vis-a-vis  by
ln =  + 
1 ln + 




5  + 
6  + 
7 ln + 
  (5)
The dependent variable is the log of the bilateral (gross) migration ﬂow from country  to country , divided
by the destination country’s population.5 All the right-hand side variables in equation (4) are also included
4In comparison Frankel and Romer (1999) include also the population of the destination country as an explanatory variable for
bilateral trade ﬂows.
5A fully symmetric deﬁnition of openness to migration would also include the migration ﬂows from  to . However, these data
are not available for many origin countries. More importantly, for the case of migration it seems clear that inﬂows are a more
important determinant of a country’s economic outcomes than outﬂows and most of the considered OECD countries have a net
positive immigration.
7here. But, in addition, we include , the share of young people in origin country  in year . The presence of
large cohorts of young individuals in the potential countries of origin is considered as a relevant determinant of
migration6. Auxiliary regressions (4) and (5) are used to predict bilateral trade and immigration ﬂows. However
equation (3) calls for destination-country-speciﬁc predictions of openness to trade and migration. Accordingly,
we aggregate our bilateral predictions over origin countries: c  =
P
 exp(ln d ) and d  =
P
 exp(ln d )
Our key identifying assumption is that the explanatory variables included in equations (4) and (5) are
uncorrelated with the error term in equation (3). This assumption would be violated by the existence of
unobserved factors that simultaneously aﬀect demographics in the origin countries and short-run changes to
economic outcomes at destination.
Given that the explanatory variables of our predictors for trade and migration openness are almost identical,
separately identifying the roles of the two variables will depend crucially on obtaining meaningful diﬀerences
between the estimates of vectors b =( 
1  
2 
7 ) and b =( 
1 
2
6) To strengthen identiﬁcation
we have also included the age structure of the population (share of the population with age 15-29) only in the
migration predictor. This choice is based on a large body of literature documenting the high propensity to
migrate for young individuals (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Hanson and McIntosh, 2010). In contrast, this
demographic group is likely to be relatively unimportant in terms of production and trade since a substantial
share may be enrolled in school and their workplace experience is still relatively limited.
3 Bilateral Trade and Migration ﬂows
3.1 Data
To estimate regressions (4) and (5) we use data on bilateral trade and migration ﬂows between all (origin)
countries in the world (with available data) and the 30 OECD (destination) countries. Table A1 in the appendix
lists the countries covered by our data. It also reports the number of immigration sending countries for which
there is non-zero migration for each destination in some representative years. The data are an unbalanced
panel beginning in year 1980 and ending in 2007. For a subset of destination countries (14) we have bilateral
migration data for the whole period, relative at least to the main countries of origin. Four more countries
(France, Luxembourg, UK and Switzerland) have data beginning in the early 1980’s (hence no observation in
1980 but several non-zero observations starting in 1983 or 1984). To the contrary, the other countries have
a shorter span of coverage for their data. For the shorter period 1998-2007 we have data for many more
countries. However, some individual bilateral ﬂows are missing for some years (for instance bilateral data in
6Pritchett (2006) argues that non-EU immigration will continue to rise in the European Union as a result of the diverging
demographic futures of Europe and the countries in the north of Africa. Several of these countries have large and growing populations
and a large share of young population and, in the light of recent events in Egypt, highly unsatisﬁed with economic prospects in
their countries.
8some destinations are only collected within a subperiod) and some countries do not report all the bilateral
ﬂows each year (hence, a smaller number of sending countries is reported in some years). Some countries are
particularly limited in terms of identifying immigrants by country of origin. The worst cases are Ireland, which
only explicitly identiﬁes migrants from the UK and the USA, and Greece, for which the OECD database contains
migration ﬂows exclusively in the year 1998. In general, however, receiving countries tend to consistently report
data from all the main sending countries, hence the increase in numbers of zero-observations in some years is
often due to the non-recording of countries with an extremely low number of observations.
Our immigration data measure the yearly inﬂow of foreign citizens who intend to be residents (at least for
some time) in the receiving countries. To span the whole period of analysis, still with some limitations and
diﬀerences across countries, we have merged bilateral immigration data from three sources. The ﬁrst source
is Ortega and Peri (2009). The OECD original series were discontinued in 1994 and with the help of Mayda
(2010) we extended the series up to 2005. The second source is United Nations (2005), which reports very
long time series but only for a subset of 15 destination countries. This source goes back to the sixties for
some countries, but ends in the early 2000’s for all of them. The third source is the International Migration
database (IMD) gathered by the OECD and available up to 2007.7 The latter has the most extensive coverage
in terms of destination and sending countries, but it only begins in 1998, and for some destinations it only has
f e wc o u n t r i e sa ss o u r c e .W eh a v em a d es u r et h a tt h ed e ﬁnitions of immigrant are consistent across databases
for each receiving country. Essentially, all datasets use as primary sources the original data released by the
statistical oﬃces of each receiving country, which try to maintain internal consistency over time. In our checks
we often ﬁnd an exact coincidence of the ﬁgures in overlapping periods. Occasionally there are slight diﬀerences
introducing discontinuities as we merge two series from diﬀerent sources. In those cases we include a dummy
in the regression to account for the possible discrete jump, as we describe below. Table A2 in the Appendix
summarizes the availability from each data source by destination country. Speciﬁcally, starting with the UN
migration data, we have ﬁlled in missing origin-destination-year observations from the IMD data. Next, we have
used the data in Ortega and Peri (2009) where IMD and UN data were missing. In a limited number of cases
we have also interpolated observations. We did this only when a data point for a bilateral migration ﬂow was
missing and both the previous and following years were available.
The total inﬂow of immigrants each year for each country of destination constitutes what we call total
(gross) immigration. We also constructed a measure of total net immigration for each receiving country, where
we correct for the outﬂow of foreign persons, due to re-migration or return migration. These data have partial
coverage as they are only available in the IMD data. We use them to perform sensitivity analysis.
The bilateral trade data in current US dollars are from the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT), October
7Downloadable at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.
92007 release8. This database is a substantial improvement on the previous DOT release (used in Frankel and
Romer (1999)). It covers 190 countries (many more than it did earlier) and it has a very accurate coverage
of import and export ﬂows especially for the period 1998-2007. No other database on trade data has coverage
extending to the recent years and covering as many countries (e.g. the UN-NBER trade data collected by ??9
ends in 2000, the WTO world trade statistics does not collect data for such a ﬁne breakdown of partners).
The measure of openness to trade for each destination country is the sum of imports and exports relative to
GDP and is obtained from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. The demographic data for the origin countries
(total population and share of the population age 15-29) are from the Penn World Tables version 6.2 and from
the UN Population Statistics. The data on income and employment are from OECD datasets and cover the
whole period 1980-2007. Speciﬁcally, GDP and capital stock data are from the OECD Productivity dataset,
and employment data are from the OECD-STAN dataset.
We also make use of the data on aggregate investment in the Penn World Tables (version 6.2) to increase the
coverage of the capital stock data. Using these data we compute total factor productivity as a Solow residual,
assuming a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 0.66 and using total employment and
capital stock as the inputs into production.10
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the sample of destination countries: immigration rates, trade
openness, and log changes for GDP per person, total GDP, population, employment, capital, and TFP. The
upper panel covers the whole period and the lower panel is restricted to the sub-period (1998-2007) for which we
have immigration data for a larger number of destination countries. Several observations are worth noting. First,
t h e r ei sal a r g ed i ﬀerence in our measures of the degree of openness to trade and openness to foreign migrants.
Traded goods account on average for 76% of output. Assuming roughly equal imports and exports, about one
third of the value of the goods consumed in a country originate from abroad. In contrast, new immigrants
are on average only 0.62% of the receiving country’s population. In order to obtain regression coeﬃcients that
have roughly the same magnitude we use immigration rates in percentages and openness to trade in shares in
our analysis (the standard deviation of both is around 0.5). Second, immigration rates, while small, are of the
same magnitude as population growth rates (0.62% and 0.51%, respectively). Hence, in our sample immigration
on average accounted for a large share of the total population growth in the receiving countries. Income per
person grew on average by 2.2% per year, with TFP growth accounting for about half of the increase. Increases
in the employment-population ratio and capital deepening contributed in similar magnitudes to the remaining
economic growth over this period.
8Described at http://www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT/help/DOThelp.htm.
9And available at http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html.
10Ideally, it would be cleaner to use total hours worked and capital services (as opposed to capital stocks) to build our TFP
measure. However, these data are only available for a small subset of our data. At any rate, our less sophisticated measure of TFP
is highly consistent with the series reported in the OECD Productivity dataset. In a regression of growth rates of the two TFP
measures we ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.92 and the standard error is 0.018.
103.2 Auxiliary Regressions
As described in section 2, we use gravity equations (4) and (5) to build predictions of immigration rates and
trade openness by destination country that are based on geography and origin-country demographic data.
In our regressions we drop missing observations (usually in the early years of the sample) and we add one
unit to the zero trade or zero immigrants observations within the sample and include them in the auxiliary
regressions. This way, as we run regressions in logarithms, we do not loose the information contained in the
zeroes. We estimate regressions (4) and (5) by OLS. We point out that we do not include any time or ﬁxed
eﬀect in order to make use of variation in trade openness and bilateral migration rates that arises purely from
bilateral geographic variables (together with common language and colonial ties dummies) and partner-country
demographics. We then calculate, for each destination and year, the overall predicted immigration rate and
trade openness as c  =
P
 exp(ln d ) and d  =
P
 exp(ln d ).
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of (4) and (5). Columns 1 and 2 display results for the bilateral im-
migration rate. The speciﬁcation in column 1 is identical to the one used to predict bilateral trade openness
in column 3. Column 2 includes the share of young in the sending countries in the prediction of immigration
rates. The estimated coeﬃcients are generally in line with those estimated in the literature. Our estimates in
column 3 are comparable to those in Frankel and Romer (1999) and Frankel and Rose (2002).11 Af e wp o i n t sa r e
worth noting. First, both for immigration and trade ﬂows, bilateral distance and the size of the origin country
in terms of population are statistically and economically important. However, both variables have a stronger
eﬀect on the ﬂows of goods than on the ﬂows of persons. In contrast, common language plays a much larger
role in determining migration than trade, consistent with language being key in facilitating skill transferability,
and a more rapid economic and cultural assimilation of migrants. Likewise, the presence of a large and young
country near the border (e.g. Mexico and the US) is a more important predictor of bilateral migration than
of trade ﬂows. Finally, colonial ties appear to aﬀect trade more than migration. Traditionally many free trade
agreements followed the lines of previous colonial empires.
The estimated coeﬃcients in columns 1 and 3 imply substantial diﬀerences in the weights assigned to the
regressors in our predictions of trade openness and immigration rates. Additionally, to strengthen identiﬁcation
of their separate roles, our main predictor for immigration rates (column 2) also includes the share of young
(age 15 to 29) in the countries of origin, but we do not include it to explain trade openness. As emphasized
in the immigration literature (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Hanson and McIntosh, 2010; Clark, Hatton, and
Williamson, 2007), this share of the population displays higher migration rates and there is no evidence indicating
that the role of this young cohort in production (of internationally traded goods) is particularly large.12 As
11Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate a similar speciﬁcation for bilateral trade ﬂows on a cross-section of data for year 1990. They
ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 082 for the log of the origin population, −143 for log distance, and 053 for the common language dummy (not
included in Frankel and Romer (1999)). These estimates are also replicated in Cavallo and Frankel (2008).
12In fact its coeﬃcient was not signiﬁcant when entered in the trade regression.
11expected, the share of young is highly signiﬁcant (column 2) and increases the goodness of ﬁto ft h eb i l a t e r a l
migration regression by about 10%.
While one can add a whole set of additional variables and interactions in the gravity equations, our goal is
to identify a minimal set of geographic factors and origin-country demographic factors that is likely to be un-
correlated with unobserved determinants of income growth in the destination country. Additional explanatory
variables, such as measures of economic size and performance of the partner countries, while surely increasing
the goodness of ﬁt of our predictors, would reduce the credibility of the exclusion restriction. Our identifying
assumption is based on the idea that the location of a country, its language and colonial ties, and the demo-
graphic structure of its potential partner countries are not correlated with annual changes in income per person,
employment-population ratio, capital intensity and total factor productivity of the country, except through
bilateral trade and migration ﬂows. While some large scale economic shocks (natural catastrophes, large re-
cessions, ﬁnancial crisis) can aﬀect the economies of many countries simultaneously, unless they also aﬀect the
demography and the geography of the countries of origin they will not aﬀect the validity of our instrument.13
3.3 Relevance of the instruments
Table 3 reports the results of a series of regressions aimed at examining the explanatory power of our predicted
immigration rates and degree of trade openness. All these regressions are at the level of destination-country and
year. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the immigration rate by destination. While in column 1 the
main explanatory variable is the predicted immigration rate, column 2 also includes the predicted trade ﬂows
as a fraction of GDP. Columns 3 and 4 are analogous but for the degree of trade openness in the destination
country as dependent variable.
Let us start by examining the top panel. Our predictors are highly relevant. As seen in columns 1 and 2,
a predicted immigration rate equal to one percent of the receiving-country’s population is associated with an
actual immigration rate of 035 to 036% and the percentage of variance explained is over 50%. Analogously,
our predicted trade ﬂows are highly relevant in explaining actual trade openness, with a coeﬃcient ranging
between 12 and 14 in columns 3 and 4. In this case, the explained variance rises over 75%.I n a l l c a s e s
we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments, as evidenced by the high F statistics on the
joint signiﬁcance of the instruments. Importantly, both immigration rates and trade openness are essentially
explained by their respective predictions. Adding predicted trade openness does not improve the F statistic for
immigration and likewise when adding predicted immigration to the trade openness regression. In words, there
13Ortega and Peri (2009) included a set of origin-destination and origin-yearﬁxed eﬀects in their predictors. Obviously, their
predictors accounted for a larger share of the variation in actual bilateral and migration ﬂows. However, one should be concerned
that these catch-all variables, albeit speciﬁc to the countries of origin, may also be absorbing variation that is correlated with
economic outcomes at destination. In comparison here we pursue a much more conservative approach by only including variables
in our gravity predictors that are very likely to be uncorrelated with shocks to economic conditions in the destination countries.
12is a diﬀerential impact of geography and origin-country demographics on the ﬂows of goods and migrants. This
is a very important pre-requisite to separately identify the causal eﬀects of immigration and trade openness on
income growth and its determinants.
The middle panel reports the results of speciﬁcations that include destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects.14 Our
predictors are still signiﬁcant although standard errors increase substantially. As a result, the strength of the
instruments is greatly reduced, particularly for trade openness. In column 3 we cannot reject the null of weak
instruments and in column 4 predicted trade ﬂows become non-signiﬁcant.15 This suggests that a large part
of the power of our instruments for trade (and to a lesser extent for migration) ﬂows is due to cross-sectional
variation. This is reasonable given that geography is time-invariant and the demographics of the countries
of origin move only slowly over time. Hence, while the instrument is successful in predicting trade openness
variation across countries and years, its within-country performance is much weaker. Let us emphasize again that
our speciﬁcations are in logarithmic changes and they already account for time-invariant destination-country
factors that determine the levels of income per person, employment rates, capital per worker, and TFP. These
factors account, to a large extent, for cross-country diﬀerences in policies, institutions and initial income levels.
Thus our regressions identify the impact of trade ﬂows and migration ﬂows on the changes in economic outcomes.
The bottom panel reports the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the reduced sample period (1998-2007) for which we
have observations for 30 OECD countries. The results are very similar to those in the top panel. It is worth
noting in column 2 (bottom panel) that the predictor for immigration and for trade openness have opposite
signs. This reinforces our conviction that the instruments are successful in separately identifying the roles of
immigration and trade openness on income growth.
4T h e E ﬀects of Immigration and Trade on Income
We now turn to the central question of this paper. How do trade and immigration ﬂows aﬀect income growth
and its components? Our main speciﬁcation is equation (3) using, alternatively, as dependent variables log
changes in income per person, in the employment-population ratio, in capital per worker, and in total factor
productivity. The main explanatory variables are the degree of trade openness (, the ratio of exports plus
imports relative to GDP) and the immigration rate (, annual inﬂows of new immigrants relative to the total
initial population). The main sample contains 30 OECD countries and spans (unbalanced) the period 1980-2007
at an annual frequency.
14We note that the speciﬁcations in (3) are already in changes. Hence, unlike Frankel and Romer (1999) we are already accounting
for time-invariant determinants of income per person. Likewise, equations (4) and (5) predict ﬂows of goods and people, as opposed
to stocks.
15Note that the standard errors are roughly ten times larger in the middle panel of column 3 compared to the top panel.
134.1 OLS estimates
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of equation (3). Each column corresponds to a diﬀerent dependent variable.
We consider regression models featuring as main explanatory variable either solely the immigration rate, or
solely the degree of trade openness. The latter is comparable to the speciﬁcation in Frankel and Romer (1999).
But we also consider speciﬁcations jointly featuring the immigration rate and the degree of trade openness.
Since in our data both variables are signiﬁcantly correlated, the latter speciﬁcation is preferred as it is less
vulnerable to omitted variable bias.16
All speciﬁcations contain year dummies and a set of indicators accounting for each observation’s source of
immigration data. The latter account for potential discrete jumps in the immigration data across data sources.
Obviously, these OLS estimates are subject to potential endogeneity bias both on account of immigrants’ location
choices and on the responsiveness of trade ﬂows to unobserved income shocks. Clearly, these concerns are less
severe for the estimates reported in panel B (bottom), which also include destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects.
These eﬀects absorb all time-invariant determinants of income growth, mitigating to some extent the previous
source of bias.
Let us begin by examining the estimates of trade openness on the economic outcomes of interest. As shown
in column 1, there is a signiﬁcant positive association between trade openness and income growth. Moreover,
this eﬀect is qualitatively robust to including the immigration rate as a regressor and to including destination-
country ﬁxed eﬀects. Note though that in the latter case (panel B) the standard errors increase by a factor
of ﬁve. Interestingly, the point estimate in our speciﬁcation where trade openness is the only regressor (panel
A, middle set of estimates) is very similar to that obtained by Frankel and Romer (1999) in a comparable
speciﬁcation, at 093 and 085, respectively. In addition, the estimates in columns 2 through 4 reveal positive
associations between trade openness and growth in employment rates and TFP, while a negative association
with growth in capital intensity. We defer interpreting the pattern of estimates and discussing the magnitudes
of the eﬀects until the next section.
Let us now turn to the role of immigration rates for income growth and its determinants. As seen in panel
A (column 1), the immigration rate appears to be uncorrelated with the short-run growth of GDP per person.
This is true both in the regression model featuring immigration solely and in the one containing trade openness
as well, with and without destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects. That is, the lack of association between immigration
and short-run income growth is a robust feature of the data. Interestingly, the results in columns 2 across all
speciﬁcations reveal a robust positive association between immigration rates and log changes in the employment
rate. Speciﬁcally, an inﬂow of immigrants equal to 1% of the population is associated to an increase in the
16The correlation coeﬃcient between immigration rates and trade openness across country-year observations is 0.49. When we
estimate a regression model for trade openness using as regressors the immigration rate, year dummies and country dummies, the
point estimate on the immigration rate is 0.13, with a robust standard error of 0.03.
14employment rate of 0.37% (joint speciﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects). The large increase in the employment rate
reﬂects a large eﬀect on total employment, together with a smaller eﬀect on the total population.17 Turning
to column 3, there appears to be a non-zero association between immigration and changes in capital intensity.
However, while in panel A the point estimate is negative in both cases, in panel B it is positive. As discussed
earlier, the speciﬁcation including destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects is more reliable since it requires weaker,
though still restrictive, assumptions for consistent estimates. Based on the estimates in column 5, we do not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant association between immigration rates and TFP growth. Of course, all of these need not be
causal eﬀects. It is entirely possible that immigrants choose to move to countries where income, employment
rates, capital intensities and TFP are growing for unobserved reasons. In this case, we would expect the
estimates reported in Table 4 to be upwardly biased. The instrumental-variables estimates in the next section
will address this issue.
4.2 Two-stage least-squares estimates
The biggest limitation of the OLS estimates in Table 4 is that they are subject to endogeneity bias, arising
both from immigration and trade openness potentially being aﬀected by unobserved determinants of income
growth. To address these issues we adopt an instrumental-variables approach, in which we use our gravity-based
predictions for immigration and trade openness as instruments.
Table 5 reports the results of the 2SLS estimation. Panel A (top) reports estimates for speciﬁcations contain-
ing year dummies and immigration-data-source dummies. The speciﬁcations in panel B (bottom) additionally
include destination-continent ﬁxed eﬀects.18 This set of dummy variables absorbs unobserved determinants of
income growth that remain constant over time during our sample period, such as international treaties facili-
tating trade and migration among neighboring countries. As before, our most preferred speciﬁcations are the
ones that jointly include the immigration rate and trade openness as explanatory variables.
Let us begin by examining the estimates of the regression models that include either the immigration rate
or trade openness in the right-hand side (the top two regressions in panel A). First of all, we note that the
coeﬃcient on trade openness is 073, statistically diﬀerent from zero. The preferred 2SLS estimate in Frankel
and Romer (1999) is 199, with an associated standard error of approximately 1. Noguer and Siscart (2005)
estimate a speciﬁcation identical to Frankel and Romer (1999) but using better data.19 Their preferred estimate
is around 1 (with a standard error ranging between 028 and 045), which is very close to our point estimate.
17When we estimated the impact of immigration rate on employment and population separately (not shown but available upon
request) we found a coeﬃcient around 0.5 for population and around 1 for employment.
18As discussed earlier, when destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced our instruments are weakened substantially. As a
second-best option we follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and include a less demanding set of destination-continent ﬁxed eﬀects.
19Noguer and Siscart (2005) use bilateral trade data from the World Trade Database (1997 release). This data contain 8096
bilateral observations. In comparison, Frankel and Romer (1999) use bilateral trade data from the IFS Direction of Trade Statistics,
1997 release, containing only 3220 observations and relying heavily on imputation. We use the more recent 2007 release of IFS
statistics that contains many more observations especially for the period 1998-2007.
15Hence, our results are highly consistent with previous studies estimating the eﬀect of trade on income.
Secondly, scrolling across columns it is striking that immigration and trade appear to have very similar
eﬀects: they increase income per person and employment rates, yet reducing capital per worker. While this
may certainly be the case, it could also be driven by an omitted variable problem arising from a strong positive
correlation between openness to trade and to immigration. To address this concern we now turn to our preferred
speciﬁcation, where the right-hand-side features both the immigration rate and trade openness. Interestingly,
the qualitative pattern of our estimated eﬀects changes substantially, strongly suggesting an omitted variables
problem in regression models that fail to include either openness to trade or openness to immigration.
Regarding the eﬀects of trade openness, we now ﬁnd only marginally signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients (third
regression in panel A). When continent ﬁxed-eﬀects are included (panel B) the point estimate increases mod-
erately (from 06 to 09) but so does the standard error so that we can not reject the null of a zero coeﬃcient.
Interestingly, this was also the case in Frankel and Romer (1999). When they introduced continent dummies
their point estimate was around one and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Furthermore, our estimates sug-
gest that trade openness may lead to TFP growth but, at the same time, reduce capital intensity, although
these estimates are only marginally signiﬁcant. Our interpretation is that increases in trade openness for OECD
countries may stimulate the reallocation of labor towards more knowledge-intensive sectors, raising the eﬃciency
and overall factor productivity of the economy as a whole. We notice a further interesting result relative to
Frankel and Romer (1999). In that paper they always estimated larger coeﬃcients of openness on income when
using 2SLS methods relative to OLS methods. This runs counter to the intuition of circular causality between
trade and openness, that should be addressed by the instruments, producing, therefore, a smaller point estimate.
The authors were well aware of that and they spent section II.E addressing and discussing this issue. One of
the possible explanations is that the instrument is correlated with other variables aﬀecting income, other than
trade. Hence geography aﬀects income through those and generate a classic omitted variable bias, that may be
exacerbated by the instruments if they are particularly correlated with the omitted variable. Immigration could
be such a variable. In our case, including both variables in the estimation the OLS and 2SLS method produce
coeﬃcients of similar magnitude, in fact usually the eﬀect of openness on income per person is smaller in the
2SLS case than in the OLS (see Table 4 Panel B versus Table 5 Panel A and B).
Let us now turn to the eﬀects of immigration. The estimates in panel A (third regression) and panel B
suggest that it has no eﬀect on income per person in the short run (column 1). In contrast, immigration
has a large, positive eﬀect on the employment rate of the receiving economy, without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting
capital intensity. Finally, immigration is associated to a negative eﬀect on TFP. More speciﬁcally, our estimates
suggest that an immigration inﬂow equal to one-percent of the population in the receiving country leads to a
16one percent increase in the employment rate and to an equally-sized reduction in TFP.20 These estimates of the
short-run eﬀects of immigration suggest that immigration triggers a capital inﬂow that keeps the capital-labor
ratio essentially unchanged. Regarding the large eﬀect on the employment rate, we note that it is not driven by
a composition eﬀect but by an increase in the employment rates of natives.21. Before providing an interpretation
in the conclusions section, let us now examine the robustness of these ﬁndings.
5E x t e n s i o n s
5.1 Balanced panels
One concern is that the data are noisier for the earlier years in our sample period, since the quality of the
immigration data is somewhat lower for those years. Indeed we had to rely more heavily on imputation and
combine more sources of immigration data for that period than for more recent years. Another concern is
data are better and more consistent for some countries (those with a longer history of immigration and more
developed) than others. On one hand an important robustness check is to repeat the analysis using only the
period 1998-2007, for which we have a panel covering the 30 OECD countries and our bilateral migration data
is from a single data source (the OECD International Migration Data). On the other, the larger sample of
countries implies that for some of them the bilateral migration data are not very complete (some countries only
report few sending countries and possibly only some years). Hence, we will also construct a panel of fewer
countries (the 14 for which we have uninterrupted data 1980-2007 plus France, Great Britain, Switzerland and
Luxembourg whose data begin in the early eighties) but with an almost balanced and full time series in each.
Table 6 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the period 1998-2007, with and without continent dummies.
The results strongly conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. In particular, the point estimates we obtain are very similar
to those reported in Table 5 for our most preferred speciﬁcation, the one including both immigration and trade
openness as regressors and continent dummies (panel C). Immigration has no short-run eﬀects on income per
person. That is to say, it increases GDP in the short run by the same percentage amount as it increases the
population. Moreover, immigration has a large positive eﬀect on the employment rate, which is oﬀset by a
negative TFP eﬀect of the same magnitude, and no capital dilution. The pattern for the eﬀects of trade is also
the same as in Table 5: trade openness has a marginally positive eﬀect on income per capita (column 1, panels
Ba n dC ) . 22 This eﬀect is the combination of a negative eﬀect on capital intensity but an oﬀsetting positive
20When destination-country ﬁxed eﬀects are included (not shown but available upon request) the standard errors grow by one order
of magnitude. As a result the point estimates become virtually uninformative. We remind the reader that our main speciﬁcations
are in log-changes and, therefore, time-invariant determinants of income per person will not aﬀect the consistency of our 2SLS
estimation.
21As shown repeatedly in the literature, the employment rates of natives and immigrants (with the same age and schooling) are
roughly similar (see for instance Docquier, Ozden, and Peri (2010))
22In additional regressions we have veriﬁed that the increase in income per capita arising from trade openness is driven by an
increase in total GDP, with no eﬀect on the size of population.
17eﬀect on TFP (columns 3 and 4, panels B and C). It is worth noting that the standard errors that we obtain in
the smaller sample are comparable, and sometimes smaller, than those in Table 5 for the whole sample. This
is partly due to the better quality data and partly by the fact that our shorter but wider panel relies more on
cross-sectional variation.
In terms of magnitudes, our estimates imply that an inﬂow of immigrants equal to 1% of the population
increases the employment-population ratio by 1% as well (and reduces TFP by roughly the same amount). In
comparison, if we take the point estimates at face value, ao n ep e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nt h et r a d et oG D Pr a t i or a i s e s
income per person 0.67%, mainly due to a growth in TFP of 1%.
Table 7 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the longer almost balanced panel of 18 countries, 1980-2007,
with and without continent dummies. The results are also in line with the previous ﬁndings. In particular,
focussing on the 2SLS estimates, that are quite consistent with or without continent dummies, we note that
immigration has no short-run eﬀects on income per person. That is to say, it increases GDP in the short run
by the same percentage amount as it increases the population. Moreover, immigration has a large positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the employment rate. This eﬀect is oﬀset by a negative TFP eﬀect of similar magnitude
(but not statistically signiﬁcant), and no capital dilution. In this longer panel of fewer countries the employment
impact of immigration seems even larger. The pattern for the eﬀects of trade is similar to that in Table 5 but the
statistical signiﬁcance is lost in this speciﬁcation. Trade openness has a positive non signiﬁcant eﬀect on income
per capita (column 1, panels B and C). This eﬀect is the combination of a negative non signiﬁcant eﬀect on
capital intensity and employment rate and an oﬀsetting positive (and non signiﬁcant) eﬀect on TFP (columns
3 and 4, panels B and C). The longer panel, relative to countries that are main destinations of immigrants and
have a longer time series, shows that the estimated short-run eﬀects of trade are rather fragile while the positive
eﬀect of immigrants on employment rate and the zero eﬀect of immigration on income per capita are robust
and conﬁrmed.
5.2 Net immigration
A criticism that applies to our previous estimates and to many aggregate studies attempting to estimate the
eﬀects of immigration on income is that they use gross inﬂows as a proxy for net inﬂows. This is a data limitation
arising from the fact that, in most countries, foreigners settling in the country have an obligation to register
their arrival. However, those leaving the country often do not have the obligation and simply do not report
their departure. As a result, the governments of the immigration countries lack accurate data on immigrant
outﬂows. Only data obtained from detailed censuses of residents and not those compiled annually by population
registries, can measure net immigration.
Exceptionally, a few studies have used special data to report high re-migration (return) rates of immigrants
18in the UK (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007) and in the US (Lalonde and Topel, 1993) but it remains hard to obtain
comprehensive data for a large number of countries. The IMD data produced by the OECD partially addresses
this issue since it contains data both on gross inﬂows and outﬂows for the period 1998-2007 by country of
origin. These estimates are based on cancellations of immigrants from local registers and from estimates of
the change in the stock of immigrants between two points in time. Using these data we construct the yearly
net immigration rates (inﬂow minus outﬂow of foreign individuals by country of origin). While still aﬀected
by the tendency to under-register of the departing migrants, these data go at least part way in allowing us to
construct the ideal variable that should be used to estimate the eﬀects of immigration on economic outcomes
of the receiving country.
Table 8 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of our models using our measure of net immigration (relative
to population). We report the estimates only for our most preferred speciﬁcation featuring both immigration
and trade openness as regressors and continent dummies. Three points are worth emphasizing. First, the net
immigration rates are also predicted rather well by the gravity instrument.23 Second, the pattern of the 2SLS
estimates on the eﬀects of immigration is largely consistent with our previous ﬁndings (columns 1 and 2, panels
B and C). Immigration has no eﬀect on income per person in the short run. It increases the employment rate
but it reduces TFP by a similar amount. The results on trade openness are roughly similar to our main ﬁndings.
They are however less precisely estimated.
5.3 Longer time intervals
So far our results represent short-run eﬀects, in the sense that our dependent variables were annual log changes.
One may have several concerns regarding this relatively high frequency. First, it may take some time until
the eﬀects of immigration on economic outcomes become measurable. Moreover, there may be a complicated
pattern of auto-correlation in the error terms. In order to address these concerns we re-estimate our models
using longer diﬀerences and, more speciﬁcally, 4-year periods.
Table 9 reports the estimates of the models with long diﬀerences. The top panel reports OLS estimates and
the middle and bottom panels report 2SLS estimates, with and without continent dummies. Again, the main
pattern observed earlier regarding the eﬀects of immigration survives this robustness check. Immigration does
not aﬀect income per person in the longer run, indicating that the increase in total income is similar to the
increase in total population. Moreover, the employment rate increases with approximately a unit elasticity and
TFP falls by a similar magnitude. Our estimates for the eﬀects of trade openness are less precise than in our
main set of estimates. Standard errors here are about ten times larger than in Table 5.24 Even though the
23The F statistic associated to the ﬁrst-stage regression is above 70 in all speciﬁcations and each coeﬃcient is individually highly
signiﬁcant.
24Interestingly, the standard errors for the estimates of the eﬀects of immigration are less than twice as large as in the annual
models. This is a relatively modest increase given the large reduction in the number of observations.
19signs of the point estimates are the same as those in Table 5 we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero eﬀects
of trade openness in any of the columns in panel C. More precisely the emerging pattern is that of very large
positive eﬀects of trade on productivity and income per person but very imprecise estimates.
5.4 Limitations of the instrumental-variables strategy
We next discuss two limitations of our approach. First, we wish to examine to what extent our results depend
on the speciﬁc set of destination countries (OECD) included in our analysis. We note that these countries
are relatively homogeneous in a number of dimensions, implying an important challenge for our pseudo-gravity
predictors for immigration and trade ﬂows arising from the limited cross-sectional variation in geography and
demographics of the origin countries. To evaluate these issues we have conducted our analysis omitting a number
of countries and we have found that omitting Luxembourg, a country with large actual and predicted trade ﬂows
and immigration rates weakens the results by signiﬁcantly reducing the predictive power of our instruments,
both in the case of immigration and trade openness. Table A3 in the appendix shows that while the OLS results
still exhibit a signiﬁcant eﬀect of immigration on the employment rate and of trade openness on income per
person. However, in our 2SLS estimates those eﬀects are no longer signiﬁcant (they maintain however the sign
of those in table 5). This sensitivity of the gravity-based instruments to the omission of Luxembourg from the
sample was also noted by Frankel and Romer (1999, page 385, footnote 12) who argued in favor of keeping
Luxembourg in the sample in order to take advantage of the identiﬁcation power deriving from it.
A second interesting issue is whether the employment and productivity eﬀects of immigration and trade
depend on the fact that a large part of those ﬂows are with other OECD countries. In this respect we conduct
our analysis using only the bilateral trade and migration ﬂows between OECD destinations and non-OECD
origins. Table A4 in the appendix reports the resulting estimates. Clearly, standard errors are much larger now
than for our main set of estimates (Table 5). The reason is that a large part of the strength of our instrument
comes from the predicted (trade and immigration) ﬂows among OECD countries.25 At any rate, the 2SLS
estimates still reveal no signiﬁcant eﬀects of immigration rates on income per person and a positive eﬀect on the
employment rate that is oﬀset by a negative eﬀect on TFP. Likewise, we ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect of trade openness on GDP per person. However the estimates of trade eﬀects become too unstable to be
taken seriously. In conclusion, it is mainly OECD-OECD trade ﬂows and that play a large role in delivering
as t r o n gs e to fi n s t r u m e n t s . 26. However the direction of the eﬀects of trade and migration is similar, with
migration stimulating employment rates and trade stimulating TFP growth.
25Recall that a large share of international trade ﬂows is intra-industry trade among similarly developed countries.
26The F statistics associated to the ﬁrst-stage regressions in this restricted sample are substantially lower than in the main sample.
Speciﬁcally, it is 33 for the predicted immigration rate and below 9 for the predicted trade openness.
206 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper asks a central question in international economics: how do international ﬂows of people and goods
aﬀect economic performance? There are many competing theories that address these questions, diﬀering in
their emphasis on the roles of factor diﬀerences, technology, product variety, and so on. All these theories have
predictions regarding the eﬀects of international trade and migration on income per person and its determinants.
Nevertheless, there are practically no cross-country studies providing joint estimates of the eﬀects of trade and
migration on income per person and, more speciﬁcally, on employment rates, capital intensity and total factor
productivity. One reason for this has been the lack of adequate international migration data.
Since the pioneering work of Frankel and Romer (1999), several authors have empirically analyzed the eﬀect
of international trade on income per person Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001); Frankel and Rose (2002); Cavallo
and Frankel (2008); Noguer and Siscart (2005). They have mostly focused on the long run and on level eﬀects.
Moreover, by ignoring the role of international migration ﬂows, those studies suﬀer an important limitation.
Many of the determinants of trade ﬂows, particularly relative geography, are also well known to determine
migration ﬂows. As a result, it is hard to know whether the existing estimates of the eﬀects of international
trade on income in those studies are the result of a spurious correlation mediated by migration ﬂows.
Using a larger dataset and more demanding econometric speciﬁcations, our instrumental-variables estimates
conﬁrm that trade openness increases income per capita, but possibly with a moderately smaller eﬀect than in
previous studies, particularly when estimated in 2SLS and in the short run. Moreover while the point estimate of
this eﬀect is positive the standard error is also large, as it was found by Frankel and Romer (1999). Furthermore
our results suggest that this positive eﬀect operates through increases in TFP. In turn, our instrumental-variables
estimates show that immigration has a large short-run eﬀect on the employment rate of the receiving economy,
but no eﬀect on income per capita. This positive eﬀect of immigration on the employment rate is the most robust
one throughout the study, being positive and signiﬁcant in almost each speciﬁcation. Immigration appears to
induce negative TFP growth in the short run that balances the positive employment rate eﬀect and leaves
income per worker unchanged.
Our ﬁndings suggest that immigration expands the receiving economy along “the extensive margin” not only
by adding workers (the immigrants) but also by increasing the employment rate of natives. An interpretation
in line with the recent immigration literature is that this eﬀect operates by expanding some sectors (Card and
Lewis, 2007; Cortés and Tessada, 2010; Farré, González, and Ortega, 2009), by providing complementary skills
(Peri and Sparber, 2009), and by stimulating job creation at the ﬁrm level (Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2010).
These forces generate higher labor demand for native workers with skills complementary to the newly arrived
immigrant workers. In part, the increased demand for labor may arise from cost-cutting by ﬁrms, as immigrants
are paid less than their marginal products (as in Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston, 2008; Ottaviano, Peri, and
21Wright, 2010; Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2010) and not from productivity enhancements. As a result, the main
eﬀect of immigration would appear in the form of employment gains. In comparison, trade expands the economy
along the “intensive margin,” by increasing the eﬃciency of use of factors, either eliminating ineﬃcient ﬁrms
(Melitz, 2003), or reallocating resources to more productive sectors. This does not generate extra employment
but raises TFP.
Another diﬀerence between the eﬀects of immigration and trade may be that immigration has a dispropor-
tionately large eﬀect on non-tradable services, often characterized by being very labor-intensive and with low
productivity growth, such as restaurants, household services, child and elderly care, and so on. As immigration
expands the size of these low-TFP sectors, it may mechanically reduce the economy’s overall TFP through a
composition eﬀect, while still generating a positive employment eﬀect on the native labor force as in Cortés
and Tessada (2010) and Farré, González, and Ortega (2009). In contrast, international trade ﬂows may have a
larger eﬀect on tradable sectors such as manufacturing, which are characterized by high productivity growth.
On the basis of our ﬁndings we conclude that the aggregate short-run eﬀects of trade and immigration on
income and income per person appear to be neutral or positive. This suggests that a country that is both open
to trade and to international migration could beneﬁt from higher employment rates (stimulated by immigrants)
as well as higher income per person (stimulated by trade). A combination of sensible policies aimed at enhancing
international trade and migration ﬂows may be an important ingredient in delivering employment and income
growth. These ﬁndings are at odds with the widespread opposition to globalization because of its negative
eﬀects on employment. We note though that our analysis has focused on aggregate economic eﬀects, leaving
aside distributional concerns that may go a long way in explaining attitudes toward globalization.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Period 1980-2007  Obs. Mean  Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Immigration rate*100  527  0.62  0.54  0.01  3.28 
Trade/GDP 611  0.76  0.48  0.16  3.13 
Δln (GDP per Person) *100  729 2.22  3.30 -23.51  11.00 
Δln (Total GDP)  *100  729 2.68  3.33 -23.44  11.99 
Δln Population *100  581 0.51  0.46 -0.59 2.08 
Δln Employment *100  729 0.92  1.58 -7.98  20.03 
Δln (Physical Capital) *100  692 2.95  2.17 -1.45  18.18 
Δln TFP *100  692 1.13  2.73 -16.38  9.17 
       
Period 1998-2007  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Immigration rate*100  268  0.68  0.62  0.01  3.28 
Trade/GDP 285  0.89  0.52  0.19  3.13 
Δln (GDP per Person) *100  280 2.83  2.36 -13.52  10.50 
Δln (Total GDP)  *100  280 3.22  2.35 -12.78  11.22 
Δln Population *100  274 0.45  0.47 -0.59 1.64 
Δln Employment *100  280 0.97  1.18 -2.50 5.75 
Δln (Physical Capital) *100  260 3.28  1.39  0.74 8.73 
Δln TFP *100  260 1.34  1.99 -14.58  9.17 
 
Note: Country-year observations covering 30 OECD countries. The mean and standard 
deviations are unweighted and calculated across countries and years. The immigration rate is 
defined as the gross inflow of new immigrants over the total population in the country at the 
beginning of the year.27 
 
 Table 2: Gravity regressions for bilateral migration flows and trade flows 
   [1]  [2]  [3] 
   Ln Immig. rate  Ln Immig. rate  Ln Trade/GDP  
ln population origin  0.58**  0.58**  0.91** 
 [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.02] 
Common border  -1.27  -2.31  0.09 
 [1.60]  [1.60]  [1.42] 
ln (pop origin 
*common border)  0.23  0.30**  0.10 
 [0.15]  [0.13]  [0.13] 
ln distance  -0.60**  -0.64**  -1.43** 
 0.15  0.16  [0.07] 
Colonial ties  -0.04  0.04  0.77** 
 [0.40]  [0.40]  [0.30] 
Common language  1.64**  1.55**  0.24 
 [0.31]  [0.31]  [0.33] 
Share young origin    0.06**   
   [0.02]   
      
Observations 79,282  66,410  69,315 
R-squared 0.20  0.23  0.46 
 
Note: Observations are defined by origin-destination country pairs by year. The immigration 
r a t e  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  n e w  i m m i g r a n t s   over  total  population  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  In 
R e g r e s s i o n s  1  a n d  2  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  t h e  n a t u r a l  l o g a r i t h m  o f  i m m i g r a n t s  f r o m  
country j to country i divided by the population of country i. In regression 3 it is the sum of 
export and imports between countries i and j divided by the GDP of country i. Share of young 
i s  t h e  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  a g e  1 5 - 2 9  y e a r s  o l d .  S t a ndard  errors  are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by destination country. Method of estimation is OLS. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: First-stage regressions. Power of the gravity-predicted variables 
 
Panel A: Main 
specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Imm. rate  Imm. rate  Trade/GDP  Trade/GDP 
Predicted Imm. rate  0.365***  0.355***    0.0938*** 
 [0.0141]  [0.0252]    [0.0135] 
Predicted Trade/GDP    0.0528  1.453***  1.256*** 
   [0.108]  [0.0448]  [0.0527] 
Observations  546 546 569 546 
R-squared  0.529 0.529 0.758 0.784 
F  statistic  668  334 1050 989 
Panel B: Destination-country fixed effects    
  
Predicted Imm. rate  0.140***      0.131***  0.0912*** 
 [0.0217]  [0.0219]    [0.0151] 
Predicted Trade/GDP    1.070**  1.169***  0.439 
    [0.427] [0.426] [0.324] 
Observations  546 546 569 546 
R-squared  0.843 0.844 0.967 0.975 
F statistic  41.44  26.63  7.5  22 
Panel C: Main specifications, balanced panel 1998-2007   
  
Predicted Imm. rate  0.385***  0.438***    0.0930*** 
 [0.0130]  [0.0288]    [0.0208] 
Predicted Trade/GDP    -0.318**  1.644***  1.344*** 
    [0.148] [0.0705] [0.105] 
Observations  257 257 265 257 
R-squared  0.674 0.684 0.728 0.754 
F  statistic  879 414 545 573 
 
Note: The Predicted values for immigration rates and trade/GDP are obtained adding the 
predictions of specification (2) and (3) of Table 2 across all trading or migration partner 
countries (j), respectively.  The immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total 
population at the beginning of the year. Each observation in the regressions is a destination 
country by year. Standard errors (in square brackets) are heteroskedasticity robust. All 
regressions include year dummies.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: The Effects of Immigration and Trade. OLS Estimates 
 
 
Panel A: OLS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/POP)  Δln(K/Empl)  Δln TFP 
Imm. rate  0.275  0.665***  -0.780***  -0.0233 
   [0.178]  [0.137]  [0.143]  [0.190] 
Observations 545  537  536 536 
R-squared 0.332 0.180  0.211  0.257 
Trade/GDP 0.937***  0.658***  -0.532***  0.393** 
   [0.189]  [0.0969]  [0.105]  [0.188] 
Observations 582  572  568 568 
R-squared 0.294 0.164  0.157  0.235 
Imm. rate  -0.265  0.450**  -0.595***  -0.333 
   [0.197]  [0.187]  [0.205]  [0.221] 
Trade/GDP 1.078***  0.428***  -0.359**  0.602*** 
   [0.210]  [0.152]  [0.180]  [0.218] 
Observations 545  537  536 536 
R-squared 0.365 0.194  0.218  0.268 
Panel B: Destination-country fixed effects 
Imm. rate  0.0922  0.368**  0.631***  -0.452 
   [0.361]  [0.175]  [0.229]  [0.398] 
Trade/GDP 3.661*** 1.187**  -1.769***  2.882*** 
   [0.974]  [0.502]  [0.564]  [1.015] 
Observations 545  537  536 536 
R-squared 0.489 0.273  0.427  0.349 
 
Note: Units of observations are OECD countries by year. The immigration rate is the ratio of 
new immigrants to the total population at the beginning of the year.  All specifications include 
year dummies. Regressions including the immigration rate in the right-hand-side also include 
immigration-data-source  dummies.  Standard  errors  (in  brackets)  are  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: The Effects of Immigration and Trade. 2SLS Estimates. 
 
Panel A: Two-stage least-squares estimates
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/POP) Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP 
Imm. rate  0.450*  1.000***  -0.779***  -0.253 
 [0.250]  [0.123]  [0.128]  [0.246] 
Observations 537  537  529  529 
R-squared 0.332 0.166  0.217  0.258 
Trade/GDP 0.729***  0.571***  -0.533***  0.329 
 [0.239]  [0.136]  [0.139]  [0.245] 
Observations 582  572  568  568 
R-squared 0.292 0.163  0.157  0.235 
Imm.  rate  -0.102  1.033*** -0.0400 -1.047** 
 [0.398]  [0.270]  [0.292]  [0.450] 
Trade/GDP 0.627* -0.0378  -0.829***  0.890** 
 [0.360]  [0.252]  [0.286]  [0.414] 
Observations 537  537  529  529 
R-squared 0.360 0.162  0.206  0.254 
Panel B: 2SLS with continent dummies 
Imm.  rate  -0.327  1.179*** -0.0941 -1.381** 
 [0.579]  [0.304]  [0.321]  [0.646] 
Trade/GDP 0.901  -0.207  -0.665*  1.234* 
 [0.585]  [0.297]  [0.340]  [0.655] 
Observations 537  537  529  529 
R-squared 0.366 0.146  0.252  0.245 
 
Note: Units of observations are OECD countries by year. The immigration rate is the ratio of 
new immigrants to the total population at the beginning of the year.  All specifications include 
year dummies. Regressions including the immigration rate in the right-hand-side also include 
immigration-data-source  dummies.  Standard  errors  (in  brackets)  are  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: The Effects of Immigration and Trade. Short and wider panel. 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP  
Panel A: OLS         
Imm. rate  -0.458*  0.415***  -0.479***  -0.488** 
 [0.248]  [0.120]  [0.152]  [0.229] 
Trade/GDP 1.361***  0.518***  -0.148  0.631*** 
 [0.273]  [0.139]  [0.190]  [0.236] 
Observations 255  248  246  246 
R-squared 0.387 0.281  0.133  0.229 
  
Panel B: Two-stage least squares     
Imm. rate  0.0239  0.821***  0.244  -0.878*** 
 [0.319]  [0.214]  [0.277]  [0.338] 
Trade/GDP 0.586*  0.144  -1.126***  0.814** 
 [0.352]  [0.201]  [0.310]  [0.359] 
Observations 240  240  240  240 
R-squared 0.305 0.239  0.036  0.226 
  
Panel C: 2SLS with continent dummies   
Imm. rate  -0.0912  1.030***  -0.0639  -1.101** 
 [0.447]  [0.309]  [0.382]  [0.454] 
Trade/GDP 0.679  -0.152  -0.749  1.078** 
 [0.534]  [0.335]  [0.464]  [0.524] 
Observations 240  240  240  240 
R-squared 0.317 0.19  0.146  0.228 
 
Note: Units of observations are OECD countries by year over the period 1998-2007. The 
immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total population at the beginning of the 
year.  All specifications include year dummies. Regressions including the immigration rate in 
the right-hand-side also include immigration-data-source dummies. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  





Table 7: Effects of Immigration and Trade. Long balanced panel 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP  
Panel  A:  OLS      
Imm. rate  0.370  0.506*  -0.460  0.0160 
  [0.257] [0.275] [0.294] [0.307] 
Trade/GDP 0.508**  0.456**  -0.655*** 0.269 
  [0.209] [0.190] [0.211] [0.243] 
Observations  440 440 440 440 
R-squared  0.348 0.198 0.180 0.279 
Panel B: 2SLS     
Imm.  rate  0.622 1.574*** 0.255  -1.036 
  [0.751] [0.547] [0.561] [0.886] 
Trade/GDP 0.261 -0.0988  -0.887**  0.653 
  [0.448] [0.351] [0.369] [0.551] 
Observations  440 440 440 440 
R-squared  0.345 0.129 0.156 0.251 
Panel C: 2SLS with continent dummies    
Imm.  rate  0.715 2.272*** 0.572  -1.746 
  [1.415] [0.852] [0.741] [1.712] 
Trade/GDP 0.116 -0.651 -0.771 1.021 
  [0.952] [0.586] [0.526] [1.175] 
Observations  440 440 440 440 
R-squared  0.344 0.031 0.205 0.218 
 
Note: The sample contains an almost balanced panel of 18 OECD countries over the period 
1980-2007. The immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total population at the 
beginning of the year. Each specification includes year dummies and immigration-data-source 
dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.  







Table 8: Effects of Immigration and Trade. Net Immigration. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP  
Panel A: OLS   
  
Net Imm. rate  0.306  1.050***  0.499*  -0.479 
  [0.381] [0.222] [0.293] [0.303] 
Trade / GDP  0.967***  0.519***  -0.631***  0.395* 
  [0.256] [0.147] [0.177] [0.237] 
Observations  177 175 172 172 
R-squared  0.337 0.338 0.159 0.215 
  
Panel B: Two-stage 
least squares 
    
  
Net Imm. rate  0.617  1.558***  0.438  -1.086* 
  [0.598] [0.417] [0.513] [0.628] 
Trade / GDP  0.504*  0.504***  -1.022***  0.337 
  [0.293] [0.167] [0.229] [0.294] 
Observations  170 170 170 170 
R-squared  0.332 0.328 0.128 0.209 
  
Panel C: 2SLS with continent dummies    
  
Net Imm. rate  0.746  1.798***  0.523  -1.225 
  [0.723] [0.542] [0.705] [0.753] 
Trade / GDP  0.306  0.403  -1.110***  0.269 
  [0.391] [0.253] [0.343] [0.394] 
Observations  170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.345  0.308  0.122  0.23 
 
Note: The sample contains all 30 OECD countries over the period 1998-2007. The 
immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total population at the beginning of the 
year. Each specification includes year dummies and immigration-data-source dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 34 
 
Table 9: Effects of Immigration and Trade. Long differences. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP 
Panel A: OLS 
 
Imm. rate  -0.370  0.373*  -0.614***  -0.399 
  [0.323] [0.210] [0.232] [0.280] 
Trade/GDP 4.618*** 1.745**  -1.296  2.449** 
  [1.396] [0.814] [1.008] [1.189] 
      
Observations  117 117 116 116 
R-squared 0.337 0.292 0.309 0.150 
 
Panel B: Two-stage least 
squares 
   
 
Imm. rate  -0.256  1.112***  -0.0405  -1.191** 
  [0.503] [0.408] [0.412] [0.522] 
Trade/GDP 3.312*  -0.242 -3.104**  3.852* 
  [1.930] [1.345] [1.547] [2.181] 
      
Observations  117 117 116 116 
R-squared 0.331 0.196 0.276 0.096 
Panel C: 2SLS with continent dummies   
 
Imm. rate  -0.402  1.264**  -0.0718  -1.443* 
  [0.738] [0.516] [0.511] [0.745] 
Trade/GDP  3.414 -1.012 -2.619 4.418 
  [3.221] [1.814] [2.117] [3.344] 
      
Observations  117 117 116 116 
R-squared 0.349 0.155 0.350 0.099 
 
Note: The units of observations are all 30 OECD countries over the period 1980-2007. All 
specifications include period dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Each 
period is the aggregate of 4 years:  1982-86, 1986-90,…, 2002-06.  




Table A1: Number of immigration sending countries recorded in the Bilateral data 
constructed by Ortega and Peri (2009) 
 
country 1980  1990  2000  2007 
Australia 54  156  195  196 
Austria     160 17 
Belgium 26  29  68  33 
Canada 161  176  196  199 
Czech Republic    13 32 
Denmark 118  123  143  174 
Finland 83  7  71  203 
France   11  201  203 
Germany 103  104  192  194 
Great Britain    78  103  93 
Greece
a       
Hungary    33 201 
Ireland
b    2 2 
Italy 24  30  182  36 
Japan 12  12  10  202 
Korea    10 28 
Luxembourg   9 201  203 
Mexico      125 
Netherlands 17  14 198 160 
New Zealand  10  50  50  201 
Norway 100  149  200  202 
Poland    61 89 
Portugal    16 24 
Slovakia      191 
Spain 24  42  157  198 
Sweden 134  149  165  193 
Switzerland   12  34 32 
Turkey     200 200 
USA 182  192  211  181 
 
Note: the database is constructed by Merging data from the Ortega and Peri (2009), 
the UN (2005) and the IMD (2010) databases as described in the Text. 
a: Greece has only data for 1998 




Table A2:  Sources of the Immigration Data 
 
Sources of the Data: 






country years  years  years 
AUSTRALIA 1983-2005  1960-2004  1998-2007 
AUSTRIA n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
BELGIUM 1984-2005  1960-2003  1998-2007 
CANADA 1980-2005  1961-2004  1998-2007 
CZECH REPUBLIC  n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
DENMARK 1990-2004  1980-2004  1998-2007 
FINLAND n.a.  1980-2004  1998-2007 
FRANCE 1984-2005  1994-2003  1998-2007 
GREECE n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
GERMANY 1984-2005  1965-2004  1998-2007 
HUNGARY n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
IRELAND n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
ITALY n.a.  1980-2000  1998-2007 
JAPAN 1980-2005  n.a.  1998-2007 
KOREA n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
LUXEMBOURG 1983-2005  n.a.  1998-2007 
MEXICO n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
NETHERLANDS 1984-2005  1960-2004  1998-2007 
NEW ZEALAND  n.a.  1950-2004  1998-2007 
NORWAY 1984-2005  1980-2003  1998-2007 
POLAND   n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
PORTUGAL n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  n.a.  n.a.  2003-2007 
SPAIN n.a.  1980-2004  1998-2007 
SWEDEN 1980-2005  1960-2004  1998-2007 
SWITZERLAND 1984-2005  n.a.  1998-2007 
TURKEY n.a.  n.a.  1998-2007 
UNITED KINGDOM  1982-2006  1964-2003  1998-2001 











Panel A: OLS        
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln TFP 
              
Imm. rate  0.477  0.349*  0.343  0.0223 
 [0.360]  [0.183]  [0.244]  [0.401] 
Trade/GDP 8.187***  1.349*  -3.916***  7.836*** 
 [1.234]  [0.809]  [0.956]  [1.286] 
        
Observations 520 512  511  511 
R-squared 0.518  0.234  0.435  0.395 
Panel B: Two-stage least squares 
             
Imm. rate  0.561  0.577  -0.791  0.322 
 [0.880]  [0.678]  [0.786]  [0.855] 
Trade/GDP 0.101  0.0504  -1.015***  0.318 
 [0.384]  [0.228]  [0.298]  [0.365] 
        
Observations 512 512  504  504 
R-squared 0.327  0.140  0.218  0.274 
 
Note: The units of observations are all OECD countries, excluding Luxembourg over the 
period 1980-2007. The immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total population 
at the beginning of the year. Each specification includes year fixed effects and we use the 
imputed trade and immigration as instruments. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust.  
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Table A4: The Effects of immigration and trade. Excludes OECD-OECD migration. 
 
Panel A: OLS        
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Δln(GDP/Pop)  Δln(Emp/Pop)  Δln(K/Emp)  Δln(TFP) 
              
Imm. rate  -0.331  0.751***  0.0571  -0.705 
 [0.462]  [0.249]  [0.363]  [0.454] 
Trade/GDP -3.402*  2.128 -6.869***  -2.778 
 [1.975]  [1.493]  [2.011]  [2.045] 
        
Observations 521  512  512  512 
R-squared 0.346 0.135 0.177  0.279 
Panel B: Two-stage least-squares 
Imm. rate  2.143  7.963**  -5.593*  -3.119* 
 [3.175]  [3.581]  [2.957]  [1.832] 
Trade/GDP 47.83*  52.97* -40.47*  3.895 
 [24.45]  [28.00]  [21.69]  [13.38] 
        
Observations 512  512  504  504 
 
 
Note:  The  units  of  observations  are  all  OECD  countries  over  the  period  1998-2007.  The 
immigration rate is the ratio of new immigrants to the total population at the beginning of the 
year.  Immigration  rates  and  trade/GDP  ratios  are  calculated  including  only  non-OECD 
countries as countries of origin of migrants or trading partners. Each specification includes 
year fixed effects and we use the imputed trade and immigration as instruments. Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 